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Abstract 
In this paper, we revisit the association between happiness and inequality. We argue that the 
interaction between the perceived and the actual fairness of the income generation process affects this 
association. Building on a simple model of individual labor-market participation under uncertainty, we 
predict that higher levels of perceived fairness cause higher levels of utility, and lower preferred levels 
of income redistribution. In societies with a low level of actual social mobility, income inequality is 
perceived more negatively with increased perceived fairness, due to the need for unexpected policy 
changes as a response to many unsuccessful investments of overly optimistic individuals. This effect 
becomes smaller as actual social mobility increases. Using data on happiness and a broad set of 
fairness measures from the World Values Survey, we find strong support for the negative (positive) 
association between fairness perceptions and the demand for more equal incomes (subjective well-
being). We also find strong empirical support for the disappointment effect in countries with low 
social mobility. Consistent with our theoretical model, the results for high-mobility countries turn out 
to be ambiguous. 
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Inequality is undoubtedly more readily borne, and 
affects the dignity of the person much less, if it is 
determined by impersonal forces than when it is 
due to design. 
Friedrich Hayek 
(1944: 117) 
 
1. Introduction 
Since Abba Lerner’s classic contributions from the 1930s, welfare economics has argued that 
income redistribution can increase overall welfare in a society with an unequal distribution of 
incomes, due to the decreasing returns to income caused by an assumed strict concavity of 
individual utility functions (Lerner, 1944). This view implies that most people in societies 
characterized by a highly skewed income distribution should, all other things being equal, be 
observed to experience lower levels of utility. With the advent of the economics of happiness, 
it has become possible – and fashionable – to test this implication on individuals’ self-
reported life satisfaction, which is arguably a reliable proxy for the economic concept of 
‘utility’.1 If Lerner’s implication – and indeed standard economic theory – is correct, we 
would expect to see a clear negative association between income inequality and life 
satisfaction of the average person. Such empirical results would be in line with the more 
recent theoretical model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), taking account of social (other-
regarding) preferences in individuals’ utility functions, equally predicting a negative relation 
between inequality and happiness.  
Even though this traditional, simple microeconomic approach predicts that overall and 
average welfare in an economy decrease with income inequality, the empirical literature on 
the association between income inequality and happiness2 has yielded ambiguous findings.3 
                                               
1 For an overview of the economic, sociological and psychological concepts of subjective well-being and validity 
studies on its alternative measures, see Diener et al. (2008), Fischer (2009a), and Veenhoven (2000).  
2 In this paper, we use the terms ‘happiness’, ‘subjective well-being’, and ‘well-being’ interchangeably. 
3 In a related field of research Clark, Frijters and Shields (2008) and Layard, Mayraz and Nickell (2009), among 
others, use micro data to analyze income inequality effects through social comparisons where persons compare 
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One of the first empirical contributions, Alesina et al. (2004), identify a negative association 
between income inequality and happiness for 12 European countries, but an association that is 
not statistically significant for most U.S. states. Explaining their results, the authors 
hypothesize that differences in perceived and actual social mobility exist between these two 
continents. Extending the sample to 30 OECD countries, Fischer (2009b) reports a negative 
association between individual life satisfaction and inequality in final income, but not for 
market-generated income inequality – potentially indicating that it is actual consumption on 
which social comparisons are based.4 In a world sample, however, the large-scale robustness 
analysis in Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008) suggests that the skewness of the income 
distribution does not, in general, affect individual happiness. 
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between inequality and happiness, 
extending previous research in two dimensions: First, we allow individuals’ subjective 
perceptions of ‘fairness’ attributed to the income generating process to affect the association 
between life satisfaction and income inequality. In the words of Hopkins (2008), we aim at 
differentiating between reward inequality (possibly caused by an unfair income generating 
process even when endowments (skills) have been equal) and endowment inequality (which 
exists prior to any market transaction, and is shown to persist even when the income 
generating process is fair). Second, we allow for differences in the actual fairness of the 
income generation process across countries, expecting that these affect how fairness 
perceptions influence the inequality-happiness-relation. Indeed, Grosfeld and Senik (2009) 
show that in the transition country Poland, at first, income inequality contributed positively to 
people’s happiness from 1992 to 1996, possibly because it was associated with given and 
perceived good economic opportunities. In contrast, in the later period from 1997 onwards, it 
affected people’s happiness negatively, possibly because lower actual social mobility 
mismatched with what people still expected it to be. Alesina et al. (2004) already conjectured 
                                                                                                                                                   
their income with a reference level. In our study, inequality rather refers to differences in absolute income across 
persons and the presence of redistributive government activities. 
4 This is in line with Hopkins’ (2008) ‘rivalry model in conspicuous consumption’ according to which income 
inequality increases individual utility under certain conditions (high income and consumption levels, and a quite 
dense income distribution), as greater incentives to compete in consumption are generated. 
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that inequality may affect people with specific values and specific views on social mobility in 
their societies differently, even if inequality in general is not associated with happiness.  
We present a stylized theoretical model, which serves to illustrate our main arguments 
and allows us to derive some testable hypotheses. This model analyzes individual labor-
market participation on the extensive and the intensive margin, depending on expected (i.e., 
perceived) fairness of the income-generating process. In the model, a society is considered 
fairer the closer the relationship between individual effort and market outcome is. It can 
therefore also be interpreted as a measure of social mobility, because with increasing fairness, 
inherited social status loses relevance. Our model allows systematic incongruences between 
actual and perceived fairness. The model predicts that persons with higher perceived fairness 
will – on average, but not in every single case – experience higher levels of utility and be less 
in favor of income redistribution.  
According to the model, it is the congruence of actual social mobility and individual 
fairness perceptions that determines how income inequality affects utility. In a country with 
high actual and perceived social mobility, individuals will invest more in human capital and 
thus, on average, realize more favorable economic outcomes – in terms of own income, but 
also concerning general economic growth. For a country that is a utopian, limiting case of 
perfect fairness, we expect that individuals with high fairness perceptions are not negatively 
affected by increased income inequality. The reason is that in this case, individuals can not 
overinvest into effort and there are no unexpected policy changes conditional on differences 
between the actual and the expected income distribution.  
In contrast, a low-mobility country, characterized by institutions impeding social 
mobility, may suffer from the following problem: With actual social mobility being low, the 
group of individuals who overestimate actual fairness tends to be larger relative to high 
mobility countries. This leads to a need for (ex ante) unexpected adjustments in fiscal policy, 
which in turn reduce utility for individuals who have invested and participate in the labor 
market and pay taxes. Ex post, higher perceived fairness in countries with low actual upward 
mobility will be negatively associated with income inequality, as inequality is increased 
through increasing the number of transfer recipients and decreasing the number of taxpayers.  
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To explore the link between perceptions of fairness, social mobility, inequality, and 
happiness empirically we use data from the World Values Survey 1997-2001 and estimate a 
happiness function. We employ Gini coefficients to measure income inequality, four different 
proxies for individuals’ perceived fairness of the income generating process, and the 
interaction of inequality with these proxies. We employ measures of institutional quality to 
approximate actual social mobility. The empirical analysis aims to explore whether and to 
what extent perceived fairness mediates the potential effects of inequality, differentiating 
between countries with low and high actual social mobility. We also investigate the relation 
between fairness perceptions and the demand for redistribution, mediating the impact of 
fairness on life satisfaction. 
We find that persons who believe the income generating process in their society to be 
fair appear to be happier and demand less income equalization (and redistribution) by the 
government. As predicted by the model, we also find strong empirical support for the negative 
effect of inequality for individuals with high fairness perceptions in countries with 
unfavorable institutions hampering social mobility. Consistent with our model, for countries 
where institutions facilitate equal investment opportunities and access to markets – thus 
triggering a close relationship between individual effort and market outcomes – the effects of 
income inequality and fairness perceptions appear rather disentangled in their interactions. 
The interaction results are corroborated in smaller samples based on measures of actual 
mobility through the education system. 
Section 2 presents a literature review, and our stylized theoretical model motivating 
the empirical analysis. From the model we then derive testable hypotheses. Data and methods 
are described in Section 3, while Section 4 presents the results. The final section concludes 
and discusses the implications of our findings. 
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2. Happiness, inequality and fairness: Theory 
 
2.1. Preliminary considerations and the literature 
In 1944, Austrian economist and social philosopher Friedrich Hayek (1944: 88) argued that 
“To produce the same results for different people, it is necessary to treat them differently. To 
give different people the same objective opportunities is not to give them the same subjective 
chances.” From this follows, as Hayek suggested, that forcing individuals’ outcomes to be 
identical and ‘fair’ implies treating people unequally, and, thus, ‘unfairly’. The relation 
between what could be termed ‘fairness’ or other moral judgments of processes and outcomes 
and social inequality is therefore far from simple and straightforward. 
The treatment of ‘utility’ in the economics literature, both by the empirical research on 
happiness as well as standard economic theory, has usually focused on pure outcomes and 
neglected social comparisons. Yet, individuals do not only derive satisfaction from outcomes, 
but probably compare themselves to others, and also enjoy ‘procedural utility’ (Veblen 1899, 
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Frey and Stutzer, 2005). If people gain the impression that processes 
affecting their own situation are ‘fair’, they are not only likely to directly derive procedural 
utility from that fact, but also tend to evaluate the outcomes of these processes differently than 
if their subjective perception of the process is that it is ‘unfair’. For example, most people 
strongly dislike losing games or sports matches, but the impact of a loss is much stronger if 
they have the – reasonable or unreasonable – impression that their opponent has not played by 
the rules. Similarly, Stutzer and Frey (2003) show that two-thirds of the beneficial effects of 
people’s influence in the political decision-making process is not through their impact on 
resulting policy outcomes, but through the procedural utility gained from participation and 
civic engagement. Experimental evidence tends to support Hayek’s broad argument: Recent 
economic experiments reveal that inequality in profits is the more tolerated (by otherwise 
generally inequity-averse individuals) the more the process leading to its generation was 
perceived as ‘fair’. Experimental research has even identified the corresponding neurological 
process in the reward center of the human brain (see Hopkins, 2008, for a summary).  
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To sum up, economic experiments show that if the process of reaching an outcome has 
been fair, then subjects in general bear an adverse outcome more easily. In contrast to our 
study, the set-up of these experiments is fairly simple, allowing actual fairness of the process 
and perceived fairness of the distribution process to coincide. However, one decisive 
contribution of our paper is to draw conclusions differentiating between actual and perceived 
fairness, which may or may not overlap, reflecting more complex real-world characteristics, 
which do not allow individuals to objectively observe actual social mobility in their societies.5 
These theoretical and experimental arguments can be applied to individuals’ 
evaluations of the distribution of income in society. Their subjective evaluation of the 
outcome – the inequality of incomes – is likely to depend on their perceptions of the processes 
creating the distribution and their evaluations of the fairness of those processes. Such a 
conjecture has already been made by Alesina et al. (2004) to explain the differential effect of 
income inequality on happiness of survey respondents in the United States compared to those 
in Western Europe. For a sample of 30 OECD countries in the WVS, Fischer (2009b) finds 
that in a socially mobile society (from the interviewees’ points of view) the negative effect of 
income inequality on well-being is mitigated, if not overcompensated. Likewise, in economic 
laboratory experiments Mitchell et al. (1993: 636) find that “inequality becomes more 
acceptable as people are better rewarded for their efforts,” which can be interpreted as an 
indication for a mediating effect of the fairness of the distribution process of ‘rewards’, i.e., 
wage incomes, on the relationship between inequality and happiness.  
In this paper, we define an income generating process as ‘fair’ if there is a direct link 
between own investment in human capital, on-the-job effort and individual economic 
outcome. The looser this link becomes, i.e., the more the individual outcome depends on 
chance, the less fair the income generating process is. This would also be the case if income 
differences were caused mainly by individual differences in innate talent or ability that cannot 
be compensated by effort. Such initial endowments could also include inherited wealth. On 
the other hand, if individuals’ perceptions of society indicate that ‘someone’ – either 
individually or collectively (e.g., through political decision-making) – is responsible for the 
                                               
5 Indeed, our model suggests that if perceived fairness is high and actual fairness has a corresponding level, the 
positive effect of inequality on subjective well-being rises with perceived fairness.  
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shape of the income distribution, moral judgments on fairness will arguably come to rest on a 
different foundation. 
Actual (objective) and perceived (subjective) fairness in the income generation process 
is often not clearly distinguished by the early theoretical and empirical literature on happiness 
or preferences for redistribution. Most studies implicitly – Alesina et al. (2004) even explicitly 
– assume that subjectively perceived and objectively existing fairness in society correspond 
perfectly. However, the empirical happiness analysis for 30 OECD countries by Fischer 
(2009b) suggests that perceived and actual social mobility in society are not necessarily 
strongly correlated. For this reason, we explicitly differentiate between actual and perceived 
fairness and put them in a systematic relation. In particular, we hypothesize that whether the 
happiness effects of income inequality are aggravated or reduced by fairness perceptions for 
most of the population hinges on whether their perceived and the actual fairness coincide or 
diverge.  
Fairness perceptions can also be argued to diverge according to political convictions: 
Left-wing parties place more weight on equity of outcomes (so-called ‘social justice’), while 
right-wing governments place more weight on efficiency and equality in opportunities, as 
voters’ definitions of fairness differ systematically across parties (Scott et al. 2001). 
Fundamental differences in fairness perceptions would thus suggest that left-wing voters are 
sensitive mainly to income inequality, but less to procedural fairness as a determinant of 
market income (see also the empirical test in Fischer 2009b). In contrast, right-wing voters 
have offsetting efficiency concerns, which lead them to focus more on equality of 
opportunities, and to accept the resulting income inequality more easily. In a conservative 
perspective, relatively large income differences might be seen as an indication that individuals 
who work hard receive their just deserts. Indeed, Alesina et al. (2004) find that left-wing 
voters are more concerned about income inequality than right-wing or centrist voters, both in 
Europe and the United States We therefore employ the respondent’s political ideology as one 
proxy of her fairness perception. 
In the course of this analysis, we predict a negative relation between fairness 
perceptions and the demand for income redistribution, which we also test against our data. 
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The relation between social mobility (perceptions) and the preference for equal incomes has 
been analyzed in a couple of previous studies. Ravallion and Lokshin (2000), using Russian 
micro data, were the first to show that self-assessed expected own social mobility, or the belief 
of being on a rising income trajectory, leads to lower demand for redistribution. Corneo and 
Gruener (2002) present a ‘public values effect’ model, concluding that “an individual who 
believes in the importance of personal hard work [for income] is expected to oppose 
redistribution” (ibidem: 86), preceding the similar arguments in Alesina et al. (2004). In 
Corneo and Gruener’s (2002) logit regressions, run with about 30 countries in various 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) waves on the question ‘Government should 
reduce inequality’, both generalized fairness perceptions and perceived past social mobility 
reduce the demand for equalizing incomes.6 In contrast, persons reporting that ‘they would 
gain [from redistribution]’ are in favor of such government policy. Population preferences for 
and against redistribution are captured by country fixed effects, an approach that we will 
follow below. A negative relation between personal income and preferences for redistribution 
is not only shown in Corneo and Gruener (2002), but also by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). 
Using U.S. General Social Survey (GSS) data, the latter corroborate the negative relation 
between perceived equal opportunities, subjective income prospects, income, and a history of 
past social mobility, with a preference for income redistribution.7 Exploiting the longitudinal 
nature of their panel data, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) construct two objective measures of 
actual income prospects, at the individual and state level. They find both to be strongly 
negatively related to individual demand for more equal incomes. Contrasting results are 
reported in Clark and D’Angelo (2008) for the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) who 
identify a positive association between own experienced social mobility (‘having higher 
                                               
6 Fairness perceptions are measured by the question ‘hard work is the key [to success]’, while social mobility 
experience is captured by the variable ‘better off than father’.  
7 Preference for redistribution is measured by the question ‘Should government reduce income difference 
between rich and poor?’. Past history of social mobility is measured by ‘having a job prestige higher than 
father’s’, and subjective income prospects are proxied by ‘expect a better life’. Equal opportunities as source of 
economic success are approximated by the question ‘Get ahead: hard work’, while unequal opportunities are 
approximated with the statement ‘Get ahead: luck/help’. 
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socio-economic status than parents’) and being in favor of having capped incomes, or state-
ownership, and being left-wing.8  
In the following, we develop a simple workhorse model, illustrating the potential 
impact of income inequality and fairness perceptions on individual well-being. 
 
 
2.2. The basic set-up of the model 
Following, among others, Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), we assume that reported 
subjective well-being or ‘happiness’ of an individual i is an increasing function of her 
instantaneous, directly unobservable utility where i is an error-term:  
 
(1) W i  w(ui)  i  
 
The error term reflects unobservable differences across individuals, such as different 
subjective interpretations of the ordinal scale on which individual well-being is reported. This 
assumption allows us to focus on standard economic utility considerations in the theoretical 
analysis, i.e., on the underlying economic forces that influence individual welfare.  
We assume, without loss of generality, that utility is linear in income y i and that effort 
invested to earn income has a negative and quadratic direct effect on utility. 
 
(2) ui  y i(ei) 
1
2
ei
2  
 
where 
 
(3) y i  g(ei) 1 1  1 i  . 
 
                                               
8 This study employs the measure ‘The government should place an upper limit on the amount of money that any 
one person can make’, which is not fully comparable to that used in previous empirical analyses.  
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Income increases with effort according to the strictly concave function g. The 
parameter   [0,1] is a society-wide fairness parameter. The closer its value is to one, the 
more reliable is the impact of individual effort on individual income. The value of this 
parameter is identical for all individuals. On the other hand, i  [0,1]  is an idiosyncratic 
parameter reflecting, for example, the family background or the place of birth of an 
individual. In general, i  captures anything in the personal background of an individual that 
may make it more difficult for her to earn an income based upon her own effort.  
We assume that the true value of   is unknown to the individual decision-makers. 
They can certainly observe the institutional framework of their society, but the web of formal 
and informal institutions that characterizes any modern society is generally complex enough 
to make any exact ex ante knowledge of the true value of   extremely unlikely. Every 
individual therefore bases her decisions on her own estimate ˜ i.
9 The idiosyncratic parameter 
i  is assumed to be determined randomly. It is drawn from an individual-specific distribution 
characterized by the continuous and unimodal pdf f i(i) with support 0,1 . Let ˆ i  denote the 
expected value of the idiosyncratic parameter for individual i. We assume that the distribution 
of ˆ i  over the population is skewed to the right, and also unimodal. We further assume that 
their own ˆ i  is known to all individuals. They do, however, not observe the value of i  that is 
eventually drawn. They only observe income and effort, but have no definitive knowledge 
about how much of the result is due to bad (good) institutions, or an (un-)lucky draw of the 
idiosyncratic parameter. Furthermore, we assume that ˆ i  is inherited: Individuals from poorer 
families or worse neighborhoods are characterized by lower values of ˆ i .
10 However, even 
individuals from unfavorable backgrounds have a chance to draw a favorable high i  from the 
distribution.  
                                               
9 Piketty (1995) has shown in a model where individual income is also determined by societal fairness and 
individual influences that differences in fairness estimations may prevail in an equilibrium with full Bayesian 
rationality. 
10 Note that there is emphatically no genetic inheritance assumed to be at work here. This approach simply 
captures the empirical regularity that individuals from low-income families often find it more difficult to rise into 
high-paying positions than those who already have a high-income background. In a utopian situation with 
completely fair institutions ( 1), the impact of the idiosyncratic parameter would be cancelled out 
completely. 
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We assume that individuals choose effort in order to maximize their expected 
instantaneous utility 
 
(4) max
e0
f i(i) g(ei) 1 1 ˜ i 1i  
1
2
ei
2



0
1
 di 
 
which straightforwardly leads to the simple first order condition 
 
(5) g'(ei) 1 1 ˜ i 1 ˆ i   ei . 
 
 
2.3. Expected and actual utility, effort and reported happiness 
From (5), we can infer individually optimal effort levels as functions of the other model 
parameters: 
 
(6)  ei
*  ei
* ˜ i, ˆ i    with   ei ˜ *  0  and  ei ˆ *  0. 
 
Clearly, for all individuals who believe initially that ˜ i   , a marginal increase of ˜ i 
is associated with an increase in expected, as well as realized utility. If (1) is stable in time, an 
increase in perceived fairness in time is associated with an unambiguous increase in reported 
happiness. Similarly, if (1) is sufficiently similar for all persons, then among individuals with 
˜ i   , persons with a higher perceived fairness will unambiguously report higher levels of 
happiness. For individuals with ˜ i   , things are more complicated. While subjectively 
expected utility increases with ˜ i, realized utility does not. Ex post, individuals tend to find 
out that they have overinvested into effort, and the magnitude of overinvestment (and the 
associated loss of utility) increases with ˜ i.  The overall effect of ex ante fairness perceptions 
on instantaneous utility is therefore ambiguous. It is also likely to be non-linear, i.e., a 
positive effect can be expected for relatively low starting levels of perceived fairness, while a 
 13 
negative marginal effect is more likely to prevail with starting levels of perceived fairness that 
already are very high. 
With effort determined and income revealed, it is easy for any individual to calculate 
her value of 1  i 1i  ex post, but individual knowledge is not sufficient to disentangle 
these two effects. Deriving an indirect utility function V from (2) and using the envelope 
theorem reveals that V ˜ i  g(ei
*)(1 ˆ i) , i.e., expected utility is linear and increasing in ˜ i. 
However, to any value of ˜ i corresponds a range of actually realized individual utility levels 
in the population, each depending on the individually drawn values, i . How will i respond if 
 i  ui(,i) Vi( ˜ i, ˆ i)  0? If  i  0, it is reasonable (although not necessary for our 
argument) to assume that the individual will claim the laurels for herself, believe in having 
drawn i  ˆ i and leave her ˜ i unchanged. If  i  0, the opposite reaction is likely: ˜ i will be 
revised downward towards ˆ i  ˜ i  for which ui(,i) Vi( ˆ i, ˆ i). For all observations that 
initially lie below the Vi-line, individuals adjust their fairness perceptions such that these 
observations eventually lie exactly on this upward-sloping line. This leads us to  
 
Proposition 1. If individuals shift the responsibility for a negative difference between actual 
and expected utility to the institutional framework by revising their fairness perceptions 
downward, then an overall positive relationship between perceived fairness and self-reported 
well-being is expected in populations of individuals that are heterogeneous with respect to 
their marginal ability to earn incomes. 
 
 
2.4. Preferences for income redistribution and reported happiness 
Let there be a simple, redistributive tax and transfer system, which consists of a proportional 
income tax with rate t levied on labor income, and of a guaranteed transfer income yT (t) paid 
to those individuals who do not earn a market income. To keep matters simple, we assume 
that government commands no screening technology that would allow it to distinguish 
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between voluntary and involuntary unemployment. Individuals therefore compare expected 
utilities on and off the labor market, and participate only if  
 
(7) (1 t) g(ei
*) 1 (1 ˜ i)(1 ˆ i)   12 ei
*  yT (t) . 
 
Thus, for any given tax and transfer system t, yT (t)  in combination with an 
individual belief ˜ i, there exists some threshold value i
T  where (7) holds with equality and 
where for any ˆ i i
T the individual decides in favor of labor market participation. Since 
procedural fairness compensates for an unfavorable idiosyncratic parameter value, the value 
of the threshold i
T is strictly declining in perceived fairness. In other words, higher perceived 
fairness yields higher planned (ex ante) labor market participation rates even in groups who 
expect relatively lower values of i . With utility being linear in income, the insurance motive 
for redistribution does not play a role. Redistribution is ex ante only in the interest of 
individuals who plan not to participate in the labor market.  
The relationship between preferences for redistribution and fairness perceptions is 
reinforced if we also allow for ex post adjustments of fairness perceptions as discussed above. 
Suppose the redistribution scheme is extended such that individuals who participate, but earn 
a surprisingly low income, are paid a transfer until they reach a net income of yT . Those 
benefiting from such a scheme would all be individuals with  i  0, who revise their fairness 
perceptions downward ex post. In other words, all transfer-recipients are characterized by low 
fairness perceptions: Either because they already had them ex ante, and decided not to 
participate in the labor market, or because they were disappointed by their individual market 
outcome and accordingly revised their fairness perception downwards ex post. This revision 
leads to an ex post fairness perception which lies below the ex ante threshold for labor market 
participation. However, any investments into effort are obviously sunk and cannot be 
retrieved. Thus follows 
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Proposition 2. An individual randomly drawn from the population is the more likely to report 
a preference for increased redistribution the lower her individual fairness perception is. 
Therefore, a stronger preference for redistribution is also expected to be positively correlated 
with less self-reported happiness. 
 
 
2.5. Fairness, inequality and self-reported happiness 
Our model contains different mechanisms that yield income inequality. The ex post market 
income of individual i is 
 
(8) y i
*  g ei
*( ˜ i, ˆ i) 1 1   1 i  . 
 
First of all, income inequality generally stems from the idiosyncratic parameter. The 
larger the variance of i  in the population, the larger the inequality of incomes ceteris paribus 
will be. This will normally also imply a large variance of ˆ i , and thus of individually chosen 
effort levels. Similarly, a larger variance of individual beliefs ˜ i also eventually results in 
larger income inequality, through the establishment of a larger variety in the individual 
choices of effort levels. 
Without developing a fully-fledged political economy model, and treating the political 
process as a black box, suppose government announces a tax and transfer system t, yT (t) ex 
ante. Suppose further that the transfer is fixed after being announced and that, if ex post more 
or less individuals than expected have a right to receive transfers, the tax rate will be adjusted 
to balance the budget. The government is fully informed about all ˆ i , but not about other 
moments of f i(i), and neither are the individuals themselves. The government is informed 
about the distribution of ˜ i in the population. Given this distribution of information, 
individuals are therefore not able to calculate a more precise estimate of the budget-balancing 
tax rate than their government.  
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Suppose at first that we are analyzing a high-fairness economy, i.e., one characterized 
by a high value of the actual fairness parameter, ideally by a value close to unity. With  1 
the influence of the idiosyncratic parameter diminishes and eventually disappears. Inequality 
in incomes and utility exists and may be large, depending on the shape of the distribution of 
˜ i, but it follows from variance in ex ante fairness perceptions, and thus differing individually 
chosen effort levels. More importantly, the number of individuals who participate in the labor 
market and unexpectedly earn an income y i
*  yT  also tends towards zero with  1. The 
reason is again that the impact of the idiosyncratic parameter disappears. The government's 
initial estimate of the budget-balancing tax rate becomes more precise, and ex post tax 
increases become more unlikely, and smaller if they occur. 
Suppose now that, under the same set of assumptions, a low-fairness economy is 
analyzed. With   0 , the impact of the idiosyncratic parameter becomes less mediated by 
fairness of institutions. Even individuals with high values of ˆ i  are at risk to become transfer 
recipients if they draw a low actual i . The estimate of the budget-balancing tax rate becomes 
less precise; ex post tax increases become more likely and, if they occur, larger with a decline 
in the value of the actual fairness parameter. Individuals adjust their fairness perception in the 
same fashion as discussed in Section 2.4., taking account of their market incomes. Thus, 
Proposition 1 still holds. However, the unexpected tax increase is a disutility to all individuals 
who (i) decided to participate in the labor market, and (ii) earned an income y i
*  yT . On the 
other hand, individuals who (i) participate in the labor market and (ii) unexpectedly earn an 
income y i
*  yT  due to a low value of i  earn a lower income with the same effort level, 
relative to the high-fairness economy. In the low-fairness economy, individuals with a 
fairness perception high enough to induce labor market participation thus suffer from lower 
utility levels than in a high-fairness economy, either due to a lower market income, or due to 
the impact of unexpected taxes.  
Finally, it is easy to see that increases in income inequality are associated with 
increases in unexpected taxes. The more individuals unexpectedly fall to incomes y i
*  yT , the 
higher the tax increase is for those who remain above the yT . The effect described above thus 
increases in magnitude with increasing inequality.  
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Proposition 3. For individuals with fairness perceptions and mobility expectations ˜ i 
sufficiently high to induce labor market participation and living in economies with low levels 
of actual social mobility  , a negative effect of income inequality on instantaneous utility and 
self-reported well-being is expected. With actual social mobility approaching its maximum, 
 1, the effect disappears for the same individuals.  
 
 
 
3. Data and Method 
 
3.1. Data 
In order to empirically test Propositions 1 to 3, we employ data from the pooled third and 
fourth waves of the World Values Survey, covering the years 1994-2001 (Inglehart et al., 
2004). The availability of reliable and internationally comparable Gini data restricts our 
choice of WVS data to around the year 1995. We follow the standard approach in the 
literature by using individuals’ responses to the question “All things considered, how satisfied 
are you with your life as a whole these days?" as proxy for (remembered) utility and the 
dependent variable for Propositions 1 and 3. The responses are distributed on a ten-point scale 
ranging from 1 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied), with a sample mean of 
about 6.3.11 In order to estimate a set of relevant personal characteristics forming the core of 
individuals’ happiness functions, we rely on the robust baseline model in Bjørnskov, Dreher 
and Fischer (2008) and Fischer (2009c). The country-level control variables include only 
country fixed effects, to avoid biasing the impact of the inequality measure through the choice 
of macro-controls. At the individual level, we include measures of age, gender, family type, 
religion, religiosity and spirituality. The baseline model is complemented with a wave dummy 
                                               
11 The WVS includes questions on both life satisfaction and happiness, but the correlation between happiness 
and satisfaction is surprisingly low (rho = 0.44). We opt for using the life satisfaction question since 1) 
translation problems seem to yield cross-country comparisons of answers to the other question less comparable 
and 2) the happiness question is more likely to capture the affective component of subjective well-being rather 
than its cognitive component (for a discussion, see Fischer 2009a). 
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and age cohort effects. The empirical models exclude measures of education, income and 
occupational status that, according to the theoretical model, should fully mediate an 
individual’s subjective success probability ˜ i (fairness perception). They are, however, 
included in additional tests further below. 
 Measures of vertical and horizontal trust (such as confidence in political institutions 
and trust in other people) do not form part of the baseline model as they may be strongly 
correlated with perceived fairness and could thus be transmission channels for our variable of 
main interest.12 Due to data availability, the baseline sample is reduced to approximately 
146,000 respondents from 68 countries; depending on the employed fairness measure, it may 
even be reduced further. The baseline results for the micro-level determinants of subjective 
well-being (SWB) in the present sample are similar to those in Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer 
(2008) – they are reported in Column 1 of Table A1 in Appendix A, while Appendix B 
presents descriptive statistics.13   
 
Measures of self-report procedural fairness and demand for income redistribution 
Individuals’ fairness evaluations of income inequality are approximated using definitions of 
fairness in the income generation process in the labor market. They include measures of social 
mobility in the labor market, such as, e.g., whether hard work determines economic success. 
All fairness perception proxies are constructed as dichotomous variables, taking on the value 
‘1’ if the respondent believes that procedural fairness is present in society, and ‘0’ if 
otherwise. These definitions of fairness perceptions have also been employed in previous 
studies such as Corneo and Gruener (2002) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). In addition, 
we approximate fairness perceptions by employing information on individual political self-
positioning on a leftist-conservative scale, arguing that conservative persons favor fairness in 
the income generation process, while leftist oriented persons are more outcome-oriented. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the fairness perception measures included in this study. 
                                               
12 Note that the inclusion of a measure of horizontal trust does not alter the main results of our analysis (e.g., in 
Tables 6 and 7), but does reduce the size of the regression samples by between 3000 and 6000 observations. 
13 For a detailed discussion of these results see Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008). 
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 The demand for income redistribution is measured using three proxies derived from the 
World Values Survey. These variables, originally recorded on a 10-point or, respectively, a 5-
point scale, were aggregated into dichotomous indicators (‘1’ = pro redistribution) in order to 
facilitate the empirical analysis in the probit models and, particularly, the interpretation of the 
results. They resemble the measures of income redistribution through governments employed 
in Corneo and Gruener (2002) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). Table 1 provides on 
overview of the variables employed and their exact codings. 
 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Measures of actual social mobility 
To test Proposition 3, perceived social mobility (perceived fairness/equal opportunities) needs 
to be distinguished from actual social mobility. Unfortunately, cross-nationally comparable 
social mobility measures are hardly available on a large scale. To exploit the large sample size 
of up to 68 countries, we suggest using several proxies of actual social mobility. First, we 
employ the Gastil index of civil liberties (Freedom House 2007) and the Fraser Index of 
Economic Freedom (Gwartney and Lawson 2008). Second, following Fischer (2009b), we 
employ measures of intergenerational mobility in terms of educational attainment, in 
particular whether student performance depends on parental background. These direct 
measures of social mobility are, however, only available for a small subsample of OECD 
countries.  
The rationale for using indices of economic freedom is that social mobility is only 
possible in an institutional framework that allows for free choice of occupation in a liberalized 
labor market, easy access to the national credit market (all measured by area 5 of the Fraser 
index, ranging from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest)), a government size not too large, triggering 
modest taxation of capital and income (captured by area 1), and a sound monetary policy that 
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does not hamper investment (area 3). In addition, legal quality and the protection of property 
rights (area 2) as well as openness to the international goods markets and access to foreign 
capital (area 4) may equally be prerequisites for a socially mobile society and actual 
procedural fairness in the income generation process. Similarly, the Gastil index of civil 
liberties (range: 1 (highest) to 7 (lowest)) captures not only freedoms of expression and 
religion, but also the economically important dimensions of freedom of assembly, association 
(such as unions and firm cartels), and equal opportunities in education.  
To test for the robustness of our results, we employ measures of actual social mobility. 
We use a measure of educational mobility based on the PISA 2003 Mathematics results, 
obtained from Fischer (2009b) and available for 27 countries in our baseline sample. 
Educational mobility is the average advantage of having a high-education family background, 
expressed in test score points. More specifically, it is the average difference between the 
performance of students with such an advantageous family background compared to average 
student performance. The closer this difference is to zero, the more independent is student 
performance from parental background, and the more socially mobile is a country’s education 
system. Appendix C presents the values of these actual social mobility measures for OECD 
countries.  
 
Measure of income inequality 
The Gini coefficients for testing Proposition 3 are obtained from UNU (2006) and relate 
roughly to the year 1995.14 We have chosen to obtain the Gini values from this specific 
database because the authors undertook special care to use reliable, high-quality income 
information to calculate the Gini coefficients to ensure its cross-country comparability; non-
comparability of Gini coefficients across countries constitutes a severe problem with 
alternative income inequality information (e.g., from the World Development Indicators 
database). As the Gini measure refers to a cross-section of countries only, its true effect 
                                               
14 Gini coefficients all are calculated on the basis of gross income or earnings and are thus prior to any 
redistribution. However, Bergh (2005) shows for 11 OECD countries with high quality national statistics systems 
that the difference between pre-transfer and post-transfer Gini coefficients is not a reliable measure of actual 
government redistribution.  
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cannot be identified due to its multicollinearity with the country fixed effects. However, 
Proposition 3 can be tested by interacting our fairness measures with the Gini coefficient. 
Appendix C displays the values for the 68 countries in the baseline sample.  
 
 
3.2. Method 
Proposition 1 predicts a positive association of individual fairness perceptions ( ˜ i = 
perceived fairness of individual i) with individual life satisfaction. For testing Proposition 1, 
we simply add the four fairness perception measures to the baseline happiness model and 
observe their relations with subjective well-being (SWBi = f(fairnessi, ...)). Vector 
includes theindividual-level control variables, country fixed effects, a wave dummy and 
cohort effects, as described above. According to the theoretical model, in equilibrium, the 
effects of fairness perceptions should entirely run through own income, education and 
occupational status, which we therefore exclude from the vector  of the baseline 
specification. We test whether these variables are transmission channels for our main 
variables of interest and therefore also report specifications including them.  
 
(9) SWBi = 'fairnessi +'+ ui 
 
Proposition 2 predicts that perceiving the income generation process as fair lowers the 
demand for income redistribution, while demanding more redistribution itself is predicted to 
be negatively associated with subjective well-being. In other words, Proposition 2 views 
equation (9) as a reduced function of the chained function (SWBi = f (REDi (fairnessi ...) …). 
We test this hypothesis by, first, estimating a model of demand for income redistribution, with 
the identical variable of interest and the same set of control variables as in equation (9). The 
estimated coefficient ' indicates the effect of fairness perceptions on the probability to be in 
favor of redistribution: 
 
(10) Pr(RED)i= 'fairnessi '+ ui 
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In a second step, we relate subjective well-being to the demand for redistribution, expecting a 
negative relation: 
 
(11) SWBi = REDi '+ ui
 
To test Proposition 3, we add the interactions of the responses to one of those fairness 
perception questions with income inequality in their home country as measured by the Gini 
coefficient to equation (9).15 
 
(12) SWBi = fairnessi + fairnessiGINI '+ u 
 
In estimating the model of subjective well-being we follow the previous literature (see, e.g., 
Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer 2008), but employ OLS in which coefficient estimates also 
represent marginal effects, facilitating the interpretation of the interaction terms. This 
approach follows Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004), who show that OLS is a feasible 
estimation procedure for a 10-point categorical happiness variable by employing the 10-
category life satisfaction question in the German Socio-Economic Panel, the analogue of 
which we have obtained from the WVS.  
Given the dichotomous nature of the measures of preference for income redistribution, 
the model of redistributive preferences is estimated as probit model, which greatly facilitates 
the calculation of the marginal effects (for the probability of reporting a pro-redistributive 
political statement). Even though the analysis focuses on the direction of (significant) 
influences of the fairness perceptions estimates, we also discuss their relative quantitative 
effects. 
The next section reports the results. 
 
                                               
15 A potential worry with these data would arise if they simply proxied for individuals’ income positions. 
However, the responses are only weakly associated with individual incomes. 
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4. Results 
 
4.1. Some basic correlations 
Prior to turning to the multivariate analysis it may be worthwhile to investigate a couple of 
simple correlations between individual life satisfaction and perceived and objective fairness, 
or, respectively, social mobility.   
 Simple correlations between measures of fairness perceptions and individual life 
satisfaction are rather low or moderate, with coefficient values ranging between roughly 0.05 
(hard work) and 0.2 (chance to escape poverty). Correlations with measures of actual social 
mobility are somewhat larger, for civil liberties (Gastil) and economic freedom (full Fraser 
index), between 0.23 and 0.26 (in absolute terms). For the subsample of OECD countries, 
measures of social mobility in terms of educational attainment show correlations similar in 
size to that of economic freedom, with coefficients for maternal and paternal educational 
dependence of 0.20 and 0.22, respectively. Finally, the correlation between income inequality 
and life satisfaction is positive, but fairly small (0.06).  
 In general, correlations of roughly 0.4 to 0.6 are achieved when an aggregate measure 
of happiness is employed in place of individual subjective well-being. Using the mean of life 
satisfaction in a country, economic freedom shows a correlation of about 0.5 to 0.6, and social 
mobility in education of about 0.6 – 0.7. Only the Gini coefficients still show a small 
correlation of 0.14 with country means in life satisfaction, possibly indicating their 
subsample-specific heterogeneous effect. Employing aggregated individual data on the four 
fairness perceptions measures, correlations with country means in life satisfaction range from 
0.06 to 0.4 and are, for at least two measures (poverty due to laziness and chance to escape 
poverty), quite  large.  
 
4.2. Testing Proposition 1: Fairness perceptions and subjective well-being 
Table 2 tests Proposition 1 by including the proxies for perceived fairness to the baseline 
specification of the well-being model, one-by-one. Overall, Table 2 tests four fairness 
measures, yielding four model variants. The table displays only the estimation results for the 
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fairness measure and the number of individual observations in the corresponding regression 
samples; the full model estimations are displayed in the Appendix (Table A1, columns 2 – 5). 
The constant in the regressions is in most cases around 8 SWB points (not reported), and the 
adjusted R2 ranges between 0.2 and 0.25, depending on the model specification.16  
First, note the positive signs of the perceived-fairness estimates, indicating that 
persons with strong fairness perceptions (a high ˜ i) are indeed happier compared to those 
who have a different view. As all four fairness estimates are significant at the 1 percent level, 
the results are clearly in line with Proposition 1. The quantitative impact of these variables is 
considerable, with coefficients ranging between 0.22 (hard work) and 0.57 (laziness). 
Comparing these effects with those of other determinants of subjective well-being as reported 
in the Appendix (Tables A1 and A2) shows that these effects are comparable with, e.g., taking 
part in religious service once a month as compared to never (0.22) or being married as 
compared to being divorced or separated (0.53). According to Table A2 in the Appendix, the 
largest associations of about half a life satisfaction category are observable for labor market 
mobility perceptions (‘people are poor due to laziness’ and ‘people have a chance to escape 
poverty’) and ‘conservative ideology’. Further investigation shows that these relative 
differences across fairness perception coefficients are not caused by changes in sample sizes 
across regressions (not reported). In summary, our empirical results are in line with 
Proposition 1, suggesting that persons who perceive the income generation process as fair 
experience higher levels of subjective well-being. 
 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
According to the theoretical model above, perceived social mobility should have a 
positive impact on individual human capital investments, expected life-time earnings and 
                                               
16 The constant can be interpreted as the baseline SWB level of the reference group, which, in this specification, 
has low fairness perceptions, is male, has no children, is religious but not affiliated to a major religion, is 
divorced or separated from her partner, does not believe in a superior being, and never attends religious service.  
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occupational status in equilibrium, with perceived social mobility affecting subjective well-
being through these transmission channels. As our next step, we therefore test the same 
empirical model specification including measures of education, income, and occupational 
status. Table 3 reports the results and shows analogously to Table 2 that persons who perceive 
themselves as living in a fair society experience higher levels of subjective well-being. In line 
with our model, persons with higher income or better education are happier (for full 
estimation results, again see Appendix Table A2). Comparing the fairness perception 
estimates across models (Tables 2 and 3), we observe for all four fairness perception measures 
smaller coefficient sizes in Table 3, with all differences statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. For example, the coefficient on ‘people have the chance to escape poverty’ is 
0.483 in Table 2, but only 0.433 in Table 3. Thus, the SWB effects of fairness and social 
mobility perceptions are partly mediated through own human capital investment. This finding 
is again in line with the theoretical model.  
 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
4.3. Testing Proposition 2: Fairness perception, demand for redistribution, and subjective 
well-being 
Table 4 tests the prediction of Proposition 2 that persons who perceive the income generating 
process as fair are less favorable towards equalizing the income distribution, most probably 
through redistribution from the rich to the poor. We estimate probit models for the four 
fairness perception variables employed in the happiness models (Proposition 1) with three 
dichotomous proxies of preference for income redistribution as dependent variables 
(preference for ‘a more equal income distribution’, for ‘eliminating income inequality’, and 
for ‘guaranteeing basic needs’, respectively). Due to missing observations in regressors and 
regressants, not all 12 possible models could be estimated. For the larger samples, we observe 
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values of Pseudo R2 between 0.05 and 0.08, a reasonable size for comparable probit 
estimations. Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates, its level of significance and the number 
of observations in the regression sample.  
Almost all regressions in Table 4 suggest that people who perceive the income 
generating process as fair are less in favor of redistribution through the government. This is 
observable for the measures ‘poverty due to laziness’, ‘chance to escape poverty’ and 
‘conservative ideology’. Notably, these individual ideology and perceived fairness effects are, 
given that we employ country fixed effects, independent of 'national' beliefs and political 
cultures. The marginal effects suggest that the effect of fairness perceptions decreases the 
probability of demanding government activities by between 3 and 13 percent. Thus, the 
results are in line with Proposition 2, suggesting that persons who believe in procedural 
fairness oppose government redistribution. 
Somewhat astonishing is the increase in the probability of favoring a more equal 
income distribution expressed by persons who believe that ‘hard work brings success in the 
long run’, possibly reflecting a modern version of Weber’s hypothesis of a Protestant work 
ethic.17 Arguably, ‘having success’ is multidimensional, whereas ‘escaping poverty’ is one-
dimensionally related to gaining income only. However, as this variable can only be included 
in model 1, we cannot draw a clear conclusion whether the positive sign is a statistical artifact 
or indicates a generic relation.  
Overall, the results in Table 4 support the prediction of Proposition 2 that perceived 
social mobility reduces the demand for income redistribution from the rich to the poor. 
 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
                                               
17 In the traditional Calvinist view and according to their predestination theory, only the efforts of the ’blessed’ 
would yield economic success, in contrast to that by the ’lost souls’. Thus, economic success in ‘this world’ is 
perceived by Calvinists as a signal for being chosen to have a good afterlife.  
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Table 5 tests the second part of Proposition 2, which predicts a negative relation 
between a preference for redistribution and individual welfare. This prediction translates into 
our empirical model based on the WVS that persons with a preference for ‘a more equal 
income distribution’, for ‘eliminating income inequality’, or for ‘guaranteeing basic needs’ 
(see Table 4) should report lower levels of subjective well-being. All three columns show 
that, indeed, persons who demand a more equal income distribution (potentially through 
government intervention) and guaranteed basic needs for everybody, are less satisfied with 
their lives compared to those with no such preferences. With coefficient estimates between 
-0.2 and -0.38, the quantitative effect on subjective well-being is of medium size, comparable 
to that of 'cohabiting' as opposed to being 'divorced or separated'. 
Overall, Tables 4 and 5 present evidence in line with Proposition 2: We find that those 
persons who perceive the society they live in as fair are less likely to demand a more equal 
(post-tax and -transfer) income distribution. Furthermore, we also find that those who do 
demand more equal incomes report lower levels of life satisfaction. 
 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
4.4. Proposition 3: Inequality and fairness perceptions 
Proposition 3 relates fairness perceptions, actual fairness in society and income inequality to 
well-being. We test Proposition 3 by interacting the individual fairness perception variables 
with the Gini coefficient, and splitting the regression samples by actual social mobility at the 
country level, as reflected by a country’s economic and political institutions that govern 
people’s economic activities. Our theoretical model predicts that in the low social mobility 
sample, we should observe a negative interaction between perceived fairness and income 
inequality. For countries with high upward mobility, we theoretically predict the negative 
interaction to become weaker and ultimately, to disappear: With actual fairness () tending 
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towards unity, negative surprises with regard to income, and thus unexpected tax increases, 
become smaller and ultimately disappear.  
Tables 6 and 7 present the estimates for perceived fairness and its interaction with 
income inequality, the two main variables of interest, in subsamples split by measures of civil 
liberties and economic opportunities.18 The measures we use to proxy for actual social 
mobility are the Gastil index of civil liberties and the Fraser index of economic freedom. 
Subindices of the full Fraser index cover aspects of government size, legal quality and 
protection of property rights, inflation and the domestic financial market, trade openness and 
access to foreign capital, and labor market regulation and other market rigidities that might 
hamper entrepreneurial activities. In particular, column 1 employs the Gastil index of civil 
liberties, while column 2 reports the results for the Full Fraser index. The remaining columns 
employ subindices of the Fraser index that relate to the five specific areas described above.19  
In the focus of our analysis are the interaction terms between income inequality and 
perceived fairness. In line with Proposition 3, in the sample of countries with low economic 
opportunities and rigid institutions (Table 6) we observe the expected negative effect, as 
indicated by the negative  interaction between GINI and the four fairness perception measures 
(in most cases significant at the ten percent level at least). Given that the GINI coefficient 
varies between 20 and 60 in the sample, the overall effect of fairness perception remains 
positive, but is reduced in size as income inequality increases.  
In Table 7, we report the results for the high social mobility countries. It turns out that 
most coefficients are either statistically insignificant or negatively signed. The former would 
be in line with our prediction for countries with near-utopian levels of actual fairness, while 
the latter suggests that even countries with high values in the measures of economic 
opportunities are still at a distance from the more utopian  1. However, the size of negative 
effects is reliably and robustly smaller in high-fairness countries, which is very strongly in 
line with our proposition 3, which predicted a weakening of the negative interaction. 
                                               
18 The complete model also includes the other micro control variables, country fixed effects, and wave and 
cohort effects, with results similar to those reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
19 For countries with high social mobility (Table 7), there is an insufficient number of observations for the 
subindices areas 1 and 2, so we cannot estimate these models. 
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Supporting the findings of Table 2, in both Tables 6 and 7 there is a positive association 
between perceived fairness and the level of subjective well-being in most of the models.  
 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Proposition 3 lets us expect a weakening of the negative interaction between fairness 
perceptions and income inequality as actual social mobility in the countries increases, up to an 
insignificant interaction in high mobility countries; the heterogeneous coefficient estimates in 
Table 7 are thus consistent with our prediction. This finding is in line with Alesina et al. 
(2004) who reported an insignificant impact of income inequality on people’s happiness in 
socially very mobile U.S. states, but a negative one in less mobile European countries.  
 
 
4.5 Robustness tests using actual social mobility measures 
The model in Tables 6 – 7 and the empirical corroboration of Proposition 3 hinges on the 
assumption that social mobility, economic opportunities and economic freedom are 
sufficiently correlated. As additional robustness test, we replicate the analyses using direct 
measures of educational mobility. These direct measures are available for some OECD 
countries only, implying the disadvantage that they substantially reduce the sample size.  
Table 8 estimates the same model as in Tables 6 and 7 for two country samples split 
by the degree of intergenerational educational mobility. We employ our measure of actual 
educational mobility, defined as the educational advantage enjoyed by a person from a high-
education family (maternal or paternal education), which is available for a maximum of 27 
OECD countries in our baseline sample. The sample is split at -22 and -27 test score points, 
respectively. Again, we report only those regression results for which at least 10 countries 
remain in each of the subsamples, resulting in two fairness perception measures (‘laziness’ 
and ‘conservative’). Columns 1 and 2 present the low educational mobility findings, 
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differentiated by either paternal or maternal family background (correlation coefficient: rho = 
0.94); columns 3 and 4 display analogous regressions for countries with a high degree of 
social mobility.  
For all fairness perception measures, in low mobility countries the negative effect of 
inequality for individuals with high fairness perceptions is clearly observable. Equally in line 
with Proposition 3, in the high mobility country sample we observe insignificant or only 
weakly significant interactions of inequality for the parents' educational background. The 
positive sign of both coefficients can be interpreted as an indication that individuals who have 
experienced upward social mobility in their family experience – and believe this to be the 
result of fair institutions – experience an adverse impact of income redistribution on their 
well-being. Again, we achieve corroborating results for those fairness perception measures 
that are similar to those employed in previous empirical studies discussed above (e.g., Corneo 
and Gruener, 2002, Alesina and LaFerrara, 2005).  
Overall, the robustness test using educational mobility measures in Table 8 is well in 
line with Proposition 3, with a negative interaction in low mobility countries, and 
heterogeneous effects in the high mobility country sample.20  
 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
To summarize, the empirical analysis clearly is in line with our theoretical hypotheses. 
Individuals who perceive their society as unfair are less likely to be satisfied with their lives 
(Proposition 1), and are more likely to oppose redistributive government activities 
                                               
20 In our view, it is not a coincidence that the process of industrialization and period of high growth in Europe 
and the United States (from 1790 on) was preceded by political reforms which abolished the competition-
hindering and incentive-incompatible medieval guild system, which fixed production technology, prices for 
goods and wages for employees, and choice of profession. It is for this reason that we view GDP growth as a 
potential alternative measure of actual social mobility (correlation (GDP growth, social mobility): 0.4), in line 
with Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) who argue that in times of rapid economic growth income inequality is 
interpreted as higher opportunities. Regressions for country samples split by economic growth yield qualitatively 
identical findings compared to when more direct measures of social mobility are employed (see Appendix Table 
A3).  
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(Proposition 2). In low mobility countries, people fare the better, the more redistribution takes 
place, reflected in reduced income inequality. This effect is enlarged by lower mobility 
perceptions: The positive effect of living in a fair society on well-being decreases as income 
inequality rises. In contrast, in high mobility countries, we observe that people are more ready 
to bear existing income inequalities and disfavor redistribution. Increasing perceived fairness 
of the income generation process does not alter the well-being effects of income inequality 
any more (Proposition 3). Because these findings provide an important qualification to some 
standard results of elementary welfare economics, we proceed with a short discussion in the 
concluding section. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions   
The empirical literature on the relation between income inequality and happiness has yielded 
ambiguous results. The starting point of this paper was that one of the potential reasons for 
this confusion might be that people evaluate the fairness of the income distribution (i.e., the 
distribution generation process) differently and that such subjective evaluations eventually 
affect their subjective well-being. Extending the previous literature, we also make the case 
that inequality assessments hinge on whether social mobility expectations meet actual societal 
mobility or not. 
We illustrate the relationship between inequality and subjective well-being in a small 
formal model where individual effort and labor market participation depends on subjectively 
perceived probabilities of success that, in turn, reflect fairness perceptions: The higher the 
probability of success, the closer is the individually perceived connection between individual 
effort and economic outcomes. We therefore in general expect a positive relationship between 
perceived fairness and overall well-being, and a negative effect on the preference for 
government redistribution. If ex ante fairness perceptions are sufficiently low, the individual 
will choose an investment level of zero, and benefit from a reduction of income inequality 
through taxes and transfers. We also distinguish between the effects of over- and 
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underestimation of the actual fairness of the income generating process. Low or high actual 
fairness is associated with low or high upward mobility, respectively. We argue that in low 
mobility countries, actual individual returns to effort are often lower than expected ones. This 
leads to an unexpected increase of the budget-balancing tax burden, and thus to a negative 
interaction between fairness perception and inequality for individuals who participate in the 
labor market. In contrast, for high mobility countries, the model predicts an insignificant 
coefficient for the interaction of fairness with inequality.  
We test this model using combined individual-level data of the pooled third and fourth 
waves of the World Values Survey (1994-2001), containing about 150’000 interviewed 
individuals in 69 countries. According to the results, the respondents’ believe that income 
inequality in society is the result of a comparably fair market process makes them 
considerably more satisfied with their lives, while a demand for more government 
redistribution for correcting the market-income distribution is negatively associated with 
happiness. However, differentiating by level of actual social mobility in a country, in 
countries with fewer economic opportunities we find evidence for a negative effect of 
inequality for individuals with high fairness perceptions. In contrast, in countries with plenty 
of economic opportunities and equal chances to success, the negative effect is either smaller 
or disappears, depending on the measure used.  
The findings obviously qualify the standard Lerner argument that more redistribution 
and less income inequality leads to an increase in welfare of the average person, and thus, in 
average welfare. Instead, the model and the empirical analysis suggest that for broad groups 
of countries the potential effects of inequality depend on the interplay between perceived and 
actual fairness of the institutional framework. The overall effect of inequality on subjective 
well-being is thus much more ambiguous at the aggregate level of society than predicted by 
many standard models. As such, our findings may hold implications for both policy and future 
theorizing on the subject. Obviously, in terms of happiness there may be a substitutive effect 
between developing institutions permitting fair market competition and social mobility, on the 
one hand, and redistributive government activities, on the other: The latter are only essential if 
actual social mobility is low but fairness perceptions are high. As human beings tend to be 
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overly optimistic in general, it would seem to be beneficial to overall welfare to implement 
policies and institutions that foster competition and allow for equal opportunities and 
economic freedom. This finding is quite in line with the definition of a just society often 
brought forward by politically conservative persons, but also congruent with Hayek’s view of 
a just world. Overall, our results suggest that creating a society with such equal opportunities 
would be preferred over a paternalistic and overly redistributive state.  
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Table 1: Measures of fairness perceptions and income redistribution 
Variable name Definition 
Fairness in the education system and the labor market 
Hard work Dummy that is ‘one’ for values below 5 on the 
question ‘In the long run, hard work usually brings 
success’ (which has a 10-point scale) 
Laziness  Dummy that is ‘one’ for individuals claiming ‘People 
are living in need because of laziness or lack of 
willpower’ and ‘zero’ when answering ‘People are 
living in need because of injustice in society’ 
Chance Dummy that is ‘one’ for individuals claiming that 
‘people have a chance to escape poverty’. 
(alternative: ‘they have little chance’) 
 
General meritocratic worldview  
Conservative Dummy that is ‘one’ for values above or equal to 7 
on a 10-point scale measuring conservative political 
ideology 
  
Demand for income redistribution 
More equal  
incomes 
Dummy that is ‘one’ for values below 5 on the 
question “Incomes should be more equal” (which has 
a 10-point scale) 
Elimination Dummy that is ‘one’ for values 1 and 2 on a 5-point 
scale measuring the ‘importance of eliminating big 
income inequalities’ (ranging from ‘very important’ 
to ‘not at all important’). 
Basic needs Dummy that is ‘one’ for values 1 and 2 on a 5-point 
scale measuring the ‘importance to guaranteeing 
basic needs’ (ranging from ‘very important’ to ‘not at 
all important’). 
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Table 2: Relations between happiness and fairness perceptions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Hard work brings success in the long run 0.224***    
number of observations 60730    
     
People are poor due to laziness   0.570***   
number of observations  62920   
     
People have chance to escape poverty   0.483***  
number of observations   59383  
     
Conservative ideology    0.411*** 
number of observations    146752 
     
Income, education, occupational status no no no no 
Other micro controls included yes yes yes yes 
Country fixed effects included yes yes yes yes 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. All models include 
the baseline micro-variables, wave, cohort and country effects (not reported). Income, education and 
occupational status are excluded from the model. *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
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Table 3: Relations between happiness and fairness perceptions – testing the transmission 
channels 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
hard work brings success in the long run 0.212***    
number of observations 60730    
     
people are poor due to laziness  0.501***   
number of observations  62920   
     
people have chance to escape poverty   0.433***  
number of observations   59383  
     
conservative ideology    0.363*** 
number of observations    146752 
     
Income, education, occupational status yes yes yes yes 
Baseline micro controls included yes yes yes yes 
Country fixed effects included yes yes yes yes 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. All models include 
the baseline micro-variables, wave, cohort and country effects (not reported). Income, education and 
occupational status are included. *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 4: Fairness perceptions and the demand for income redistribution  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Incomes 
should be 
more equal 
importance 
to eliminate 
income 
inequality 
importance of 
guaranteeing 
basic needs 
hard work brings success in the long run 0.097***   
 [8.44]   
marginal effect 0.035   
number of observations 59325   
Pseudo R2 0.0521 
   
people are poor due to laziness, not injustice -0.230*** -0.311*** -0.249*** 
 [20.79] [18.83] [10.92] 
marginal effect -0.082 -0.110 -0.034 
number of observations 74588 28814 29114 
Pseudo R2 0.0574 
 
0.0792 
 
0.063 
 
people have chance to escape poverty -0.147***   
 [11.95]   
marginal effect -0.052   
number of observations 57822   
Pseudo R2 0.0505 
   
conservative ideology -0.217*** -0.360*** -0.224*** 
 [23.68] [19.69] [9.43] 
marginal effect -0.075 -0.134 -0.034 
number of observations 128917 34193 34610 
Pseudo R2 0.07 
 
0.0847 
 
0.0633 
 
    
Country fixed effects included yes yes yes 
Income, education, occupational status no no no 
Baseline micro controls included yes yes yes 
 
Notes: Probit estimations. Dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of preference for income redistribution. 
All models include other micro controls such as gender, age, family type, marital status, religion, religiosity, 
spirituality, cohort effects, country fixed effects and a wave dummy. Excluded from the model are measures of 
education, income, and occupational status. Missing regressions are due to insufficient sample sizes. *, **, *** 
denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Subjective well-being and the demand for redistribution 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Importance to eliminate income inequality -0.338***   
 [6.40]   
Incomes should be more equal  -0.380***  
  [26.86]  
Importance to guaranteeing basic needs   -0.177*** 
   [4.19] 
    
baseline micro controls included yes yes yes 
income, education, occupational status no no no 
country fixed effects included yes yes yes 
    
number of observations 34193 128917 34610 
Adjusted R-squared 0.24 0.22 0.24 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. All models include 
the baseline micro-variables, wave, cohort and country effects (not reported). Excluded from the model are 
measures of education, income, and occupational status. *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Analysis by low social mobility through little economic opportunities  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Civil liberties  
low 
Fraser  
full index  
< 6.3 
government  
size  
large 
legal  
quality  
low 
inflation  
high 
openness  
low 
new  
business  
difficult 
   area 1 area 2 area 3 area 4 area 5 
        
Hard work * GINI -0.001 -0.005** -0.007 -0.002 -0.004* -0.004 -0.003 
 [0.33] [2.03] [0.88] [0.70] [1.73] [1.46] [0.79] 
Hardwork 0.221* 0.424*** 0.493** 0.290*** 0.403*** 0.361*** 0.348*** 
 [1.72] [4.26] [2.18] [2.61] [4.26] [3.49] [2.98] 
Observations 28613 28037 20722 29630 33111 27768 22566 
        
Chance * GINI -0.004 -0.016*** 0.015* -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.014*** 
 [1.44] [7.13] [1.77] [6.66] [6.83] [6.23] [4.71] 
Chance 0.718*** 1.114*** 0.142 1.144*** 1.090*** 1.025*** 1.013*** 
 [5.73] [11.61] [0.56] [10.27] [11.58] [9.97] [9.14] 
Observations 30488 29914 20127 30373 34941 28540 23551 
        
Laziness * GINI -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.007 -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.015*** 
 [2.91] [3.36] [1.08] [5.29] [4.01] [3.26] [5.46] 
Laziness 0.938*** 0.900*** 0.683*** 1.085*** 0.968*** 0.839*** 1.075*** 
 [7.57] [9.66] [3.51] [10.80] [10.37] [8.78] [10.94] 
Observations 35191 35810 36686 38145 37779 35407 36027 
        
Conservative * GINI -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.016*** 
 [2.99] [4.77] [2.87] [4.75] [4.98] [5.04] [7.45] 
Conservative 0.732*** 0.871*** 0.792*** 0.867*** 0.911*** 0.840*** 1.033*** 
 [6.83] [10.15] [6.12] [9.55] [10.01] [9.94] [12.09] 
Observations 67018 62055 47160 73857 57237 70405 65921 
        
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. All models include 
the baseline micro-variables, wave, cohort and country effects (not reported). Excluded from the models are 
measures of education, income, and occupational status. *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent level, respectively. 
 
 
 43 
Table 7: Analysis by high social mobility through good economic opportunities  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Civil liberties  
high 
Fraser  
full index  
> 6.2 
inflation  
low 
openness  
high 
new business  
easy 
   area 3 area 4 area 5 
      
Hard work * GINI -0.005** 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.005* 
 [2.03] [0.21] [0.33] [0.17] [1.74] 
Hardwork 0.438*** 0.253** 0.22 0.315*** 0.436*** 
 [4.98] [1.98] [1.57] [2.60] [3.82] 
Observations 31355 21319 16245 21588 26790 
      
Chance * GINI -0.013*** 0.007** 0.005 0 -0.006** 
 [5.78] [2.03] [1.15] [0.07] [2.10] 
Chance 0.929*** 0.097 0.165 0.486*** 0.620*** 
 [9.77] [0.64] [1.00] [3.60] [4.90] 
Observations 28161 18535 13508 19909 24898 
      
Laziness * GINI -0.002 -0.002 -0.007** -0.004 0.011*** 
 [0.80] [0.71] [2.38] [1.24] [4.84] 
Laziness 0.508*** 0.407*** 0.573*** 0.515*** -0.03 
 [7.04] [4.37] [5.54] [5.31] [0.34] 
Observations 49436 38220 36251 38623 38003 
      
Conservative * GINI -0.004** -0.004* -0.004** -0.002 0.004** 
 [2.32] [1.86] [2.12] [0.87] [2.00] 
Conservative 0.527*** 0.454*** 0.468*** 0.440*** 0.218*** 
 [8.20] [5.84] [6.13] [5.21] [2.82] 
Observations 78967 68787 73605 60437 64921 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. All models include 
the baseline micro-variables, wave, cohort and country effects (not reported). Excluded from the model are 
measures of education, income, and occupational status. *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent level, respectively. For area 1 and 2, the number of observations was too low.  
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Table 8: Educational mobility, fairness perceptions and income inequality 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Low mobility Low mobility High mobility High mobility 
 father mother father mother 
Laziness  1.084*** 1.131*** 0.024 0.001 
 [7.72] [7.73] [0.14] [0.01] 
Laziness * GINI -0.022*** -0.023*** 0.007 0.008* 
 [5.15] [5.21] [1.49] [1.75] 
Number of observations 22903 19951 13248 16200 
Number of countries 14 13 10 11 
     
Conservative  0.734*** 0.833*** 0.083 0.008 
 [5.58] [6.08] [0.61] [0.07] 
Conservative * GINI -0.009** -0.011*** 0.004 0.006* 
 [2.37] [2.89] [1.12] [1.73] 
Number of observations 34835 30812 20180 24203 
Number of countries 14 13 12 13 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. All models include 
the baseline micro-variables, wave, cohort and country effects (not reported). Excluded from the model are 
measures of education, income, and occupational status. *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix A: Full results 
Table A1: baseline model; fairness perceptions and life satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
age -0.141*** -0.143*** -0.139*** -0.143*** -0.139*** 
 [9.03] [5.88] [6.81] [5.84] [8.90] 
age^2/100 0.251*** 0.246*** 0.236*** 0.242*** 0.246*** 
 [7.48] [4.69] [5.43] [4.56] [7.33] 
age^3/1000 -0.133*** -0.122*** -0.122*** -0.120*** -0.130*** 
 [6.20] [3.59] [4.42] [3.52] [6.08] 
male -0.044*** 0.003 0.004 -0.01 -0.063*** 
 [3.11] [0.15] [0.20] [0.46] [4.46] 
buddhist 0.185** 0.538*** 0.375*** 0.510*** 0.164** 
 [2.53] [4.87] [3.31] [4.45] [2.25] 
muslim -0.126** 0.054 -0.201*** 0.063 -0.123** 
 [2.43] [0.67] [2.72] [0.76] [2.37] 
catholic 0.011 0.183*** -0.007 0.183*** 0.003 
 [0.26] [2.87] [0.13] [2.85] [0.08] 
protestant 0.170*** 0.312*** 0.117** 0.318*** 0.159*** 
 [3.81] [4.76] [2.09] [4.77] [3.56] 
orthodox -0.335*** -0.212*** -0.381*** -0.205*** -0.315*** 
 [6.47] [2.84] [6.04] [2.72] [6.10] 
other Christian denomination -0.049 0.550*** 0.234** 0.534*** -0.05 
 [0.70] [4.50] [2.41] [4.46] [0.71] 
no denomination -0.001 0.171*** 0.005 0.189*** 0.002 
 [0.03] [2.62] [0.09] [2.87] [0.03] 
jewish -0.077 0.146 0.002 0.153 -0.058 
 [0.61] [0.80] [0.01] [0.83] [0.47] 
hindu 0.249*** 0.481*** 0.288*** 0.498*** 0.248*** 
 [3.39] [4.33] [2.65] [4.40] [3.39] 
single female 0.194*** 0.178*** 0.220*** 0.162*** 0.164*** 
 [6.45] [3.68] [5.62] [3.34] [5.48] 
single male 0.184*** 0.202*** 0.167*** 0.199*** 0.153*** 
 [5.92] [3.98] [4.05] [3.93] [4.94] 
married 0.706*** 0.744*** 0.727*** 0.725*** 0.689*** 
 [36.39] [24.56] [30.40] [23.72] [35.56] 
cohabiting 0.300*** 0.322*** 0.325*** 0.364*** 0.274*** 
 [8.81] [6.42] [7.19] [7.38] [8.05] 
has had 1 child -0.147*** -0.127*** -0.081*** -0.131*** -0.163*** 
  
 [6.19] [3.53] [2.66] [3.64] [6.90] 
has had 2 children -0.120*** -0.129*** -0.032 -0.117*** -0.135*** 
 [5.19] [3.70] [1.09] [3.32] [5.85] 
has had 3 or more children -0.174*** -0.131*** -0.085*** -0.123*** -0.188*** 
 [7.32] [3.62] [2.75] [3.37] [7.92] 
service part: > once a week 0.479*** 0.519*** 0.507*** 0.478*** 0.447*** 
 [18.34] [12.02] [13.67] [10.96] [17.18] 
service part: once a week 0.282*** 0.315*** 0.300*** 0.269*** 0.249*** 
 [12.30] [8.52] [9.87] [7.26] [10.85] 
service part: one a month 0.185*** 0.227*** 0.247*** 0.167*** 0.164*** 
 [7.44] [5.98] [7.84] [4.41] [6.61] 
service part: on common holy days 0.195*** 0.170*** 0.186*** 0.145*** 0.178*** 
 [8.87] [5.14] [6.74] [4.33] [8.08] 
service part: on specific holy days 0.300*** 0 0.321*** 0 0.291*** 
 [5.94] [.] [5.85] [.] [5.77] 
service part: once a year 0.104*** 0.157*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.092*** 
 [3.96] [4.13] [3.92] [3.29] [3.51] 
service part: less than once a year -0.01 0.001 0.01 -0.033 -0.015 
 [0.39] [0.03] [0.32] [0.91] [0.64] 
believes in superior being 0.044** 0.112*** 0.096*** 0.148*** 0.021 
 [2.36] [3.83] [4.13] [4.95] [1.13] 
hard work brings success in the long run  0.224***    
  [11.65]    
people are poor due to laziness, not injustice   0.501***   
   [29.39]   
people have chance to escape poverty    0.483***  
    [23.69]  
Conservative ideology     0.411*** 
     [27.89] 
Constant 8.126*** 4.226*** 5.030*** 4.432*** 7.959*** 
 [33.52] [11.43] [15.26] [11.91] [32.91] 
Country fixed effects, wave fixed effects, age cohorts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 146752 60730 85343 59383 146752 
Adjusted R-squared 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.23 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. *, **, *** denote 
significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
Table A2: fairness perceptions, income, education, occupational status and life 
satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Age -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.158*** -0.161*** 
 [6.13] [6.22] [6.40] [10.23] 
Age squared/100 0.263*** 0.262*** 0.274*** 0.291*** 
 [4.98] [5.05] [5.14] [8.62] 
Age to the power of three/1000 -0.127*** -0.134*** -0.136*** -0.153*** 
 [3.75] [4.03] [3.96] [7.14] 
male -0.013 -0.01 -0.016 -0.047*** 
 [0.57] [0.44] [0.69] [3.09] 
buddhist 0.407*** 0.274** 0.380*** 0.072 
 [3.76] [2.36] [3.38] [1.01] 
muslim 0.117 -0.035 0.125 -0.081 
 [1.47] [0.43] [1.55] [1.59] 
catholic 0.061 -0.065 0.076 -0.103** 
 [0.98] [1.02] [1.20] [2.40] 
protestant 0.188*** 0.047 0.205*** 0.043 
 [2.93] [0.71] [3.13] [0.97] 
orthodox -0.272*** -0.431*** -0.262*** -0.371*** 
 [3.73] [5.87] [3.54] [7.33] 
other Christian denomination 0.400*** 0.280** 0.408*** -0.068 
 [3.34] [2.43] [3.46] [1.00] 
no denomination 0.049 -0.052 0.074 -0.105** 
 [0.76] [0.80] [1.14] [2.38] 
jewish -0.093 -0.002 -0.058 -0.266** 
 [0.52] [0.01] [0.32] [2.16] 
hindu 0.402*** 0.282** 0.422*** 0.176** 
 [3.69] [2.50] [3.80] [2.45] 
Income level 1 ref. cat.    
     
Income level 2 0.176*** 0.257*** 0.213*** 0.176*** 
 [4.52] [6.71] [5.43] [6.75] 
Income level 3 0.371*** 0.433*** 0.365*** 0.355*** 
 [9.39] [11.05] [9.06] [13.64] 
Income level 4 0.563*** 0.614*** 0.559*** 0.597*** 
 [13.76] [15.39] [13.65] [22.55] 
Income level 5 0.708*** 0.755*** 0.728*** 0.758*** 
 [16.80] [17.99] [16.85] [27.51] 
Income level 6 0.831*** 0.820*** 0.786*** 0.872*** 
 [18.30] [18.39] [17.23] [29.64] 
Income level 7 0.971*** 0.988*** 0.960*** 1.028*** 
 [20.32] [20.59] [19.62] [32.98] 
Income level 8 1.114*** 1.052*** 1.044*** 1.105*** 
 [21.59] [20.48] [20.10] [32.69] 
  
Income level 9 1.206*** 1.188*** 1.176*** 1.173*** 
 [21.30] [20.46] [20.08] [31.17] 
Income level 10 (highest) 1.386*** 1.303*** 1.292*** 1.284*** 
 [23.54] [22.05] [21.97] [32.60] 
no income information 0.692*** 0.698*** 0.660*** 0.762*** 
 [16.40] [16.64] [15.15] [27.75] 
no education /incomplete ref. cat.    
primary education     
completed primary education 0.337*** 0.320*** 0.352*** 0.157*** 
 [8.19] [8.09] [8.45] [6.37] 
incomplete sec., techn. 0.369*** 0.328*** 0.353*** 0.240*** 
 [7.93] [7.22] [7.42] [8.50] 
complete sec., techn. 0.538*** 0.489*** 0.539*** 0.280*** 
 [12.93] [11.86] [12.69] [10.86] 
incomplete sec., uni prep. 0.359*** 0.390*** 0.371*** 0.269*** 
 [7.70] [8.86] [8.04] [9.54] 
complete sec., uni prep. 0.584*** 0.520*** 0.570*** 0.360*** 
 [13.48] [12.44] [13.04] [13.67] 
lower-level tertiary edu. 0.533*** 0.528*** 0.524*** 0.386*** 
 [10.33] [10.45] [10.12] [12.25] 
upper-level tertiary edu. 0.764*** 0.702*** 0.735*** 0.503*** 
 [17.37] [16.27] [16.64] [18.23] 
education missing 0.524*** 0.383*** 0.519*** 0.327*** 
 [4.01] [3.77] [3.92] [5.97] 
divorced or separated ref. cat.    
     
single female 0.059 0.099** 0.06 0.054* 
 [1.23] [2.13] [1.25] [1.81] 
single male 0.115** 0.116** 0.126** 0.044 
 [2.29] [2.38] [2.53] [1.42] 
married 0.535*** 0.541*** 0.533*** 0.465*** 
 [17.69] [18.40] [17.47] [23.99] 
cohabiting 0.252*** 0.309*** 0.323*** 0.192*** 
 [5.11] [6.35] [6.66] [5.73] 
has had no child ref.cat.    
     
has had 1 child -0.093*** -0.091** -0.095*** -0.139*** 
 [2.63] [2.57] [2.67] [5.98] 
has had 2 children -0.093*** -0.031 -0.079** -0.113*** 
 [2.71] [0.91] [2.29] [4.98] 
has had 3 or more children -0.001 0.012 0.01 -0.080*** 
 [0.02] [0.34] [0.28] [3.43] 
employed ref.cat.    
     
self-employed 0.047 0.015 0.038 0.005 
 [1.33] [0.44] [1.08] [0.22] 
housewife 0.079** 0.089*** 0.105*** 0.121*** 
 [2.27] [2.61] [3.00] [5.54] 
  
retired -0.091** -0.147*** -0.083** -0.151*** 
 [2.32] [3.85] [2.09] [5.87] 
other 0.009 -0.043 -0.011 -0.119** 
 [0.13] [0.63] [0.15] [2.57] 
student 0.115** 0.094** 0.081* -0.043 
 [2.52] [2.09] [1.76] [1.51] 
unemployed -0.536*** -0.537*** -0.504*** -0.601*** 
 [15.42] [15.85] [14.60] [27.36] 
service part: > once a week 0.509*** 0.480*** 0.479*** 0.448*** 
 [12.01] [11.56] [11.17] [17.52] 
service part: once a week 0.302*** 0.293*** 0.263*** 0.247*** 
 [8.32] [8.29] [7.24] [10.97] 
service part: one a month 0.221*** 0.218*** 0.166*** 0.160*** 
 [5.95] [5.95] [4.44] [6.60] 
service part: on common holy days 0.157*** 0.156*** 0.140*** 0.164*** 
 [4.85] [4.82] [4.26] [7.59] 
service part: on specific holy days . 0.388*** . 0.294*** 
 . [3.56] . [5.93] 
service part: once a year 0.135*** 0.113*** 0.111*** 0.074*** 
 [3.61] [3.04] [2.95] [2.89] 
service part: less than once a year 0.018 -0.004 -0.020 -0.008 
 [0.51] [0.12] [0.57] [0.33] 
service part: never ref.cat.    
     
believes in superior being 0.164*** 0.191*** 0.193*** 0.063*** 
 [5.71] [6.72] [6.56] [3.41] 
     
hard work brings success in the long 
run 0.212***    
 [11.22]    
people are poor due to laziness  0.501***   
  [23.39]   
people have chance to escape poverty   0.433***  
   [21.59]  
conservative ideology    0.363*** 
    [25.10] 
Constant 3.066*** 3.479*** 3.389*** 7.177*** 
 [8.13] [9.15] [8.92] [29.01] 
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Wave dummy, cohort effects yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 60730 62920 59383 146752 
Adjusted R-squared 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.26 
 
Notes: The specification of this model is based on Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008) and Fischer (2009c). 
 
  
Table A3: Economic Growth, fairness perceptions and income inequality 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 10-year growth 30-year growth high & stable   10-year growth 30-year growth low or unstable  
 high high 10-year growth  low low 10-year growth 
Hard work 0.464*** 0.201 0.238  0.359*** 0.400*** 0.416*** 
Hard work * GINI -0.005 0.002 0.001  -0.003 -0.005** -0.005** 
Observations 24178 18886 17392  28500 41844 35286 
        
Laziness 0.156 0.423*** 0.386***  0.806*** 0.761*** 0.784*** 
Laziness * GINI 0.007** -0.003 -0.001  -0.008*** -0.004* -0.006*** 
Observations 30277 37003 28895  46091 48340 47473 
        
Chance  0.183 0.480*** 0.472***  1.147*** 1.019*** 1.017*** 
Chance * GINI 0.009** -0.002 -0.001  -0.017*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 
Observations 22269 21278 15657  29437 38105 36049 
        
Conservative 0.144 0.478*** 0.085  0.787*** 0.752*** 0.861*** 
Conservative * GINI 0.008*** -0.004* 0.008**  -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.010*** 
Observations 49700 68328 46378  73649 78424 76971 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. All models include the baseline micro-variables, wave, 
cohort and country effects (not reported). Excluded from the model are measures of education, income, and occupational status. *, **, *** denote 
significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Life satisfaction 150793 6.36 2.59 1 10 
age 150466 41.16 16.19 15 101 
age^2/100 150466 19.56 15.01 2.25 102.01 
age^3/1000 150466 10.44 11.74 0.34 103.03 
male 150793 0.48 0.50 0 1 
buddhist 150793 0.01 0.11 0 1 
muslim 150793 0.15 0.36 0 1 
catholic 150793 0.32 0.47 0 1 
protestant 150793 0.13 0.34 0 1 
orthodox 150793 0.09 0.28 0 1 
other Christian denomination 150793 0.02 0.14 0 1 
no religious affiliation 150793 0.22 0.41 0 1 
jewish 150793 0.01 0.10 0 1 
hindu 150793 0.02 0.16 0 1 
age category 25-34 150466 0.24 0.42 0 1 
age category 35-44 150466 0.21 0.41 0 1 
age category 45-54 150466 0.16 0.36 0 1 
age category 55-64 150466 0.12 0.32 0 1 
age category > 65 Jahre  150466 0.11 0.31 0 1 
income category 2 150793 0.13 0.33 0 1 
income category 3 150793 0.13 0.34 0 1 
income category 4 150793 0.13 0.34 0 1 
income category 5 150793 0.11 0.31 0 1 
income category 6 150793 0.09 0.28 0 1 
income category 7 150793 0.07 0.26 0 1 
income category 8 150793 0.05 0.22 0 1 
income category 9 150793 0.04 0.19 0 1 
income category 10 150793 0.04 0.18 0 1 
income missing 150793 0.13 0.34 0 1 
completed primary education 150793 0.15 0.36 0 1 
incomplete secondary edu., technical 150793 0.09 0.29 0 1 
complete secondary edu., technical 150793 0.17 0.38 0 1 
incomplete secondary edu., university prep. 150793 0.10 0.29 0 1 
complete secondary edu., university prep. 150793 0.16 0.36 0 1 
lower-level tertiary education 150793 0.07 0.26 0 1 
upper-level tertiary education 150793 0.13 0.34 0 1 
education missing 150793 0.02 0.15 0 1 
single female 150793 0.11 0.31 0 1 
single male 150793 0.13 0.34 0 1 
married 150793 0.57 0.50 0 1 
cohabiting 150793 0.05 0.21 0 1 
has had 1 child 150793 0.15 0.36 0 1 
has had 2 children 150793 0.27 0.44 0 1 
has had 3 children 150793 0.27 0.45 0 1 
  
Self-employed 150793 0.09 0.28 0 1 
housewife 150793 0.13 0.34 0 1 
retired 150793 0.14 0.35 0 1 
other occupational status 150793 0.02 0.13 0 1 
student 150793 0.07 0.26 0 1 
unemployed 150793 0.09 0.29 0 1 
service part.: > once a week 147044 0.12 0.33 0 1 
service part.: once a week 147044 0.19 0.39 0 1 
service part.: one a month 147044 0.12 0.32 0 1 
service part.: on common holy days 147044 0.16 0.37 0 1 
service part.: on specific holy days 147044 0.02 0.13 0 1 
service part.: once a year 147044 0.08 0.27 0 1 
service part.: less than once a year 147044 0.10 0.29 0 1 
believes in superior being 150793 0.76 0.42 0 1 
hard work brings success in the long run 61716 0.54 0.50 0 1 
people are poor due to laziness, not injustice 86498 0.33 0.47 0 1 
people have chance to escape poverty 60278 0.39 0.49 0 1 
conservative ideology 150793 0.23 0.42 0 1 
GINI 150793 37.77 10.33 21.5 63.43 
civil liberties (Gastil) 150015 3.14 1.42 1 6 
Fraser index of economic freedom 134641 6.33 1.21 3.45 8.65 
area 1 (Fraser) 134641 5.48 1.68 1.8 8.6 
area 2 (Fraser) 134641 6.25 1.91 2.8 9.6 
area 3 (Fraser) 134641 6.90 2.71 0 9.8 
area 4 (Fraser) 134641 7.08 1.22 3.2 9.3 
area 5 (Fraser) 134641 5.91 1.12 3.2 8.8 
educational mobility (maternal) 56024 -24.27 19.19 -57.74 20.14 
educational mobility (paternal) 56024 -29.79 21.51 -63.91 11.26 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics, income inequality and educational mobility 
Country GINI 
educational 
mobility 
educational 
mobility 
  (mother) (father) 
Albania 28.02   
Algeria 45.33   
Argentina 47.6   
Armenia 48.6   
Australia 41.7 -28.88 -35.44 
Austria 30.5 -11.69 -6.6 
Azerbaijan 50.1   
Bangladesh 28.3   
Belarus 30.4   
Belgium 28.5 -31.7 -28.29 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 32.7   
Brazil 59.6   
Bulgaria 24.5   
Canada 27.6 -21.03 -23.05 
Chile 57.9   
Colombia 51.3   
Croatia 33.4   
Czech Republic 26.6 -54.27 -61.98 
Denmark 33.2 -24.94 -40.95 
Dominican Republic 49   
Egypt 38.6   
El Salvador 50.8   
Estonia 37.6   
Finland 26.1 -16.97 -21.09 
France 25.6 -16.5 -19.02 
Georgia 38.9   
Germany 30 -21.28 -29.72 
Greece 35.2 -20.6 -15.9 
Hungary 27.9 -57.74 -63.91 
India 32   
Indonesia 38.29   
Ireland 34.6 -19.18 -23.84 
Italy 32.2 -1.28 3.26 
Japan 35 -28.49 -33.87 
Jordan 47.26   
Latvia 27   
Lithuania 33.6   
Macedonia 28.2   
Mexico 50.3 20.14 11.07 
Moldova 34.4   
Netherlands 29.4 -32.6 -28.56 
New Zealand 40.2 -13.26 -32.25 
Nigeria 41.2   
  
Norway 33.3 -27.37 -23.16 
Pakistan 37.8   
Peru 44.9   
Philippines 45   
Poland 33.1 -53.94 -55.1 
Portugal 35.6 -1.7 11.26 
Russia 30.5   
Singapore 39   
Slovak Republic 21.5 -48.59 -62.22 
Slovenia 28.2   
South Africa 62.3   
South Korea 33.6   
Spain 25.9 -25.07 -27.14 
Sweden 32.4 -2.59 -2.48 
Switzerland 33.1 2.41 -8.71 
Taiwan 30.78   
Tanzania 44.7   
Turkey 44.1 -34.85 -50.23 
Uganda 47.38   
Ukraine 25.7   
United Kingdom 32.4   
United States 37.9 -28.86 -34.53 
Uruguay 44.8   
Venezuela 53.8   
Zimbabwe 63.43   
 
Notes: Based on the regression sample in Table 3 with the largest sample possible, adding conservative 
ideology as measure of fairness perceptions.  
 
 
